Uneven key pre-distribution scheme for multi-phase wireless sensor networks by Çatakoğlu, Abdullah Onur et al.
Uneven Key Pre-Distribution Scheme for Multi-Phase 
Wireless Sensor Networks 
Onur Catakoglu and Albert Levi 
 
Sabanci University, 34956, Orhanli, Tuzla, Istanbul, Turkey 
catakoglu@sabanciuniv.edu, levi@sabanciuniv.edu 
Abstract. In multi-phase Wireless Sensor Networks (WSNs), sensor nodes are 
redeployed periodically to replace nodes whose batteries are depleted. In order 
to keep the network resilient against node capture attacks across different 
deployment epochs, called generations, it is necessary to refresh the key pools 
from which cryptographic keys are distributed. In this paper, we propose 
Uneven Key Pre-Distribution (UKP) scheme that uses multiple different key 
pools at each generation. Our UKP scheme provides self healing that improves 
the resiliency of the network at a higher level as compared to an existing 
scheme in the literature. Moreover, our scheme provides perfect local and 
global connectivity. We conduct our simulations in mobile environment to see 
how our scheme performs under more realistic scenarios.  
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1   Introduction 
Wireless Sensor Networks (WSNs) are used to carry wide range of data for various 
kinds of applications such as military, security, smart homes, telehealth, 
environmental observation and industry automation. Information that is transferred 
via those networks may contain not only temperature readings for habitat monitoring 
but also classified military data for battlefield surveillance which should not be seen 
by an unauthorized person. Therefore, security should be prioritized for these 
applications. WSNs have very limited resources in terms of memory and 
computational power. Hence, symmetric key cryptography is mostly used for existing 
key management schemes. However, pre-distribution of the symmetric keys 
effectively and efficiently in terms of resource usage are always been a challenge in 
WSNs.  
An attacker can learn key rings that are inside of any node by corrupting the node 
and use these keys to compromise links between other sensor nodes. In Random Key 
Pre-distribution (RKP) scheme by Eschenauer and Gligor [1], an adversary corrupts 
sensor nodes of the network persistently (i.e. constant attacker) will eventually learn 
the whole key pool of the corresponding sensor network.  
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Most of the recent studies do not consider mobile environment i.e. they assume 
that sensor nodes are static. However, it is not a realistic assumption to make, because 
there are many types of applications in commercial, environmental and military 
studies such as housekeeping robots, service industry, wildlife tracking, patient 
tracking, autonomous deployment, shooter detection [3] which require a new network 
topology that takes mobility of nodes into consideration. 
In this paper, we propose Uneven Key Pre-distribution (UKP) scheme for 
multiphase wireless sensor networks in mobile environment. The main idea of our 
method is the uneven pre-distribution of keys, which are taken from distinct key 
pools. At every deployment, newly deployed nodes will have their keys not only from 
the previous key pools, but also from a new distinct key pool. Therefore, keys in the 
network will be renewed at each redeployment phase and this will provide self 
healing to the network. Our results showed that we have better resiliency than RoK 
scheme without decreasing the local connectivity of network and without adding any 
additional memory overhead. Differently from the most of schemes, UKP uses 
multiple distinct key pools to refresh keys instead of using forward and backward 
hash operations for the sake of resiliency. In our scheme, hash operation is used only 
for creating a session key between two nodes from common keys. 
The rest of the paper is organized as follows: Section 2 explains the related work 
on WSN security. Section 3 provides a comparative overview of our scheme and 
explains it in more detail. Section 4 presents the performance evaluations and Section 
5 concludes the paper. 
2   Related Work 
Because public key cryptography is a very costly option for WSNs, most of the 
studies use symmetric cryptography. RKP is the most popular scheme that is proposed 
by Eschenauer and Gligor [1]. In this work, each wireless node picks keys from the 
same key pool before the deployment and if two nodes have at least one common key, 
they can establish a secure communication. However, a constant attacker eventually 
learns all the keys in the key pool and he can compromise the whole network [5]. 
Chan et al. [2] improved RKP scheme by using a threshold value, q > 1, for the 
number of common keys that are used for establishing a connection. Yet it requires 
more keys to be stored before the deployment which causes memory overhead, or it 
requires fewer keys in the key pool that leads to increase chance of same key being 
used more than once. 
In RoK scheme [5], Castelluccia and Spognardi improved RKP scheme by using 
forward and backward hash chains to form a resilient network against node capture 
attacks. RoK scheme will be explained in detail at the third section. 
There are some other works inspired by RoK that focus on multiphase networks. 
RPoK [6] is a polynomial-based RKP scheme proposed by Ito et al. for multiphase 
WSNs. Using private sub-key that is indirectly stored into every each node, they are 
able to establish a resilient network. Yi et al. [4] separates work time of the nodes into 
phases. They proposed a hash chain based scheme (HM scheme) for multiphase 
WSNs by using different key matrices for every phase.  
3   Uneven Key Pre-Distribution Scheme 
In this section, we firstly explain preliminaries and definitions that are used in 
explaining RoK [5] and our UKP schemes. Then, we overview the RoK [5] scheme 
and finally we explain the proposed UKP scheme in detail. 
3.1   Preliminaries and Definitions 
Notation used for RoK and UKP is explained in Table 1. 
Table 1.  Symbols used for RoK and UKP 
Symbol Explanation 
  Sensor A 
  Last generation of the network 
     Forward key pool at gen.  
     Backward key pool at gen. 
   Key pool of gen.   
   Number of keys that are taken from key pool   
  
 
 Number of keys that are taken from key pool   for node A 
  Key pool size 
    
 
 Forward key ring of A at gen. 
    
 
 Backward key ring of A at gen. 
   
 
 Key ring of A that deployed at gen.   
    Generation window 
   
 
  -th forward key at gen.   
   
 
  -th backward key at gen.   
    
 
    -th key of  
  
    Common secret key between sensor A and B 
     Secure hash function 
  Key ring size 
Because sensor nodes are battery operated systems, they have to be redeployed 
periodically for the sake of connectivity of the network. These new nodes are 
assumed to be deployed at regular epochs which are called generations. Also, lifetime 
of a node is assumed to have an upper bound and it is determined by generation 
window,   . A newly deployed sensor node’s battery at generation   will deplete 
before generation     . 
In RoK [5], keys are updated and refreshed at the end of each phase. Therefore, 
two nodes which are from different generations can establish a secure channel with 
this update mechanism. UKP follows a different mechanism for that purpose. It is 
based on average age of nodes in the network i.e. keys are pre-distributed to a node 
according to its life time. Every sensor node from generation   can communicate with 
another sensor node from different generation in the range of               as in 
the RoK. However in UKP, instead of taking   number of keys from a key pool, a 
node takes its keys from    number of key pools. In other words, our scheme pre-
distributes the keys not just from the key pool of the current generation, but also from 
key pools of future generations. 
3.2   Overview of RoK Scheme 
In the RoK scheme [5], key pools evolve for each new generation and sensors update 
their key rings by hashing their keys. In other words, keys have lifetimes and they are 
refreshed when a new generation is deployed. This mechanism is achieved by using 
forward and backward hash chains. Each sensor node takes its keys from both 
forward and backward key pools,     and    , that are associated to its generation. 
Each key pool has     random keys.  
Forward key pool at generation   defined as          
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for forward and backward key ring respectively. 
A sensor B deployed at generation   in the range of              communicates 
with sensor A while their common keys’ indices are              respectively as 
follows. 
while     , 
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If two neighboring nodes have multiple shared common keys, all of them are used for 
the session key,    . An adversary cannot compute keys from past generations by 
using forward keys, and cannot compute keys from future generations by using 
backward keys. Therefore, this mechanism provides forward and backward secrecy. 
3.3   Proposed Uneven Key Pre-distribution Scheme 
In this paper we propose Uneven Key Pre-Distribution (UKP) scheme for 
multiphase wireless sensors in mobile environment. The main idea of UKP is to 
distribute keys considering nodes’ average life time statistic that is also represented in 
RoK [5] as shown in the Fig. 1. According to the statistic, when    = 10 and average 
life time of a node is            with Gaussian distribution, most of the nodes in the 
network are newly deployed or young. After the age of four, the number of old nodes 
decreases dramatically. 
 Fig. 1. Distribution of average age of the nodes. 
Pools and Key Assignments. In UKP, there are   distinct pools that cannot be 
associated with each other. A sensor node takes its keys from    number of 
consecutive key pools in terms of generations. In order to decide how much to take 
from a key pool, we use the statistic shown in Fig. 1. In that case, a sensor will have 
the most keys from its descendant key pool and takes fewer and fewer keys from key 
pools that belong to further generations. For instance, a node at generation   takes its 
keys from                 . Relationship between key counts is         
         . Based on the statistic on Fig. 1, while the difference between   , 
     and     is smaller, difference between      and      is much greater and it 
will continue to grow in further generations until the generation window is reached. 
Hence, keys that are captured are only valid between        
th
 and        
th
 
generations and this provides forward and backward secrecy. The key ring of node  , 
which is denoted as    
 
 is composed of all the key sets coming from different 
generations of key pools as stated above. Similarly, if node B is at generation    , 
key ring of node B which is    
   
 will take its keys from key 
pools                  . Node B does not have any keys from    pool. In other 
words, if there are    number of differences in terms of generations between two 
nodes, these two nodes will not share any common keys. In this way, we provide self 
healing because compromised keys become outdated in time. We can represent key 
ring of a node A at generation   as follows. 
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where,     
                are the keys selected from corresponding  
  using 
uniform random distribution with replacement.  
The size of the key ring produced in this way,   is calculated as follows. 
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The purpose of having an uneven key distribution, i.e., using more keys from 
closer key pools in terms of generation is to achieve higher local connectivity in 
network. Moreover, this will strengthen the self healing property, since a 
compromised key has less chance to exist in further generations. In other words, most 
of the keys will be outdated sooner than the remaining ones and resiliency will be 
enhanced by the arrival of the new nodes with fresh keys. 
Session Key Establishment. Any two nodes, say node   and node  , can establish a 
session key only if they share at least one common key in their key rings. The session 
key is computed as the hash of all common keys that nodes   and   share. This key is 
denoted as    . The common keys used in session key establishment are chosen 
irrespective of the generations of keys. In other words, even if the two nodes come 
from different generations, they use all of the keys in their key rings to find common 
keys for session key establishment. Let us say that node   comes from generation  , 
node   comes from generation   and the condition     holds for node generations. 
Then, if the common keys   and   share are denoted as  
    
       
    
     
 
    
     
        
                
then, the session key is computed as follows. 
          
               
Example. As an example, if node   comes from generation  , node   comes from 
generation     as shown in Fig. 2, and the set of common keys they share are    
 
, 
   
 
,    
   
,    
   
,    
   
,    
   
 and     
   
, the session key is computed as follows. 
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Again, the common keys coming from different key pools 
                         and consequently different generations are used together 
to form the session key. 
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Fig. 2. Generation windows and overlapping generations of nodes   and  . 
4   Performance Evaluation 
We evaluated performance of our scheme with various simulations. In this section, we 
first explain performance metrics and then give simulation results together with the 
configuration and parameters. 
4.1   Performance Metrics 
Local connectivity is an important metric that shows the performance of the key 
distribution mechanism. It is defined as the probability of sharing a common key 
between two neighboring sensor nodes. 
High local connectivity shows that a node can establish a secure communication 
with most of its neighbors. However, high local connectivity does not guarantee high 
global connectivity. Global connectivity is used to check if there are any nodes that 
are not reachable from the rest of the network. It is calculated as the ratio of the 
number of nodes in the largest isolated component to the number of nodes in the 
whole network. 
In order to evaluate resiliency of the network we look at the ratio of additionally 
compromised links in the event of node capture. In other words, resiliency is 
computed as the number of indirectly corrupted channels divided by the number of all 
establishes links. We have better resiliency when the number is smaller. In our 
proposed scheme, we evaluated resiliency for active channels. 
4.2   Evaluation by Simulation 
For the sake of a fair comparison, we used similar setup as in the RoK [5] scheme for 
our simulation. The number of nodes in the network is taken as 1.000. We set the 
number of keys in each pool,  , as 10.000 and key ring size, , as 500 for each node. 
Note that   value will be     for forward and backward key rings of the RoK 
scheme. Generation window,      is taken as 10 and we assume that a node’s lifetime 
is determined according to a Gaussian distribution with mean        and with 
standard deviation      . Deployment area is 500 x 500 meters and sensor node’s 
wireless communication range is 40 meters. Nodes are distributed in that area with 
uniform random distribution. Speed of a node is decided randomly between 5-15 
meters per minute. Note that, we assumed network topology does not change over 
time for the sake of simplicity. In other words, nodes whose lifetimes expired will be 
replaced with new ones. We take  average of 25 runs to get more realistic results. 
We developed our simulation code in C# using MS Visual Studio 2010. 
Simulations are conducted on a computer with 64-bit Windows 7 running on Intel 
Core i7-2600 CPU, 8.00 GB RAM. 
Instead of using a static environment, we run our simulation with mobile nodes to 
expand the usage of UKP. The mobility models that we use are explained next. After 
that we explain the attacker and the simulation results. 
Mobility Models.  In order to simulate node mobility, we used two models: (a) 
random walk mobility model, (b) reference point group mobility model. These models 
are summarized below and detailed information can be found in [7]. 
In Random Walk Mobility Model, a sensor node chooses a direction and speed 
randomly using uniform distribution. Then it moves in that direction for a fixed 
amount of time, which is taken as 1 minute in our simulations. When it finishes its 
movement, this process repeats itself with new direction and speed. Past location and 
speed information are not stored, so no memory usage is needed.  
Reference Point Group Mobility Model covers both groups’ random movement and 
random movement of individual nodes inside a group. Each group moves based on a 
node that is chosen as central node. Individual nodes pick a reference point randomly 
around the central node and move as in the Random Walk Mobility Model .Reference 
points are updated with the movement of central node.  
Attacker Model. We assume that attacker can learn keys of a node by capturing it. 
As stated in RoK scheme, if a forward key captured in generation  , it is possible to 
compute key with same index for generations after   and it is also possible for 
backward keys for generations before      . Because key pools in the UKP scheme 
are distinct, there is no such association between keys of different generations. 
However, the attacker learns all the keys in a captured node including keys that 
belong to further generations. In our model, an eager attacker captures nodes at 
constant rate at each round and attack will not stop until the end of the simulation. 
Simulation Results. We computed local connectivity, global connectivity and 
resiliency performance of our UKP scheme in comparison with RoK scheme [5].  
Both RoK and our UKP schemes under both mobility models have perfect local and 
global connectivity. In other words, every single node is reachable in the network and 
every node share at least one key with its neighbors. 
For the evaluation of the network resiliency, we consider an attacker who captures 
sensor nodes with rates 1, 3 and 5 nodes per round (1 generation = 10 rounds). In our 
simulations, attacker starts compromising nodes at generation 5 in order to allow 
some time for network stabilization. Since keys in the network renewed by arrival of 
new nodes, rate of compromised keys sharply decreases at every new generation. 
Figure 3 shows that in random walk model UKP scheme has almost same ratio of 
compromised keys under light attack (capture rate = 1). As attacker captures more 
nodes per round, our scheme outperforms RoK [5] model in terms of resiliency. 
Figure 4 also gives us similar results with reference point group mobility model. 
Compared to RoK, we have better results with capture rates 3 and 5. 
  
 
Fig. 3. Resiliency of RoK and UKP in case of an eager attacker with capture rates of 1, 3, and 
5 nodes per round with Random Walk model 
 
Fig. 4. Resiliency of RoK and UKP in case of an eager attacker with capture rates of 1, 3, and 
5 nodes per round with Reference Point Group Mobility model. 
5   Conclusions 
In this paper, we proposed uneven key pre-distribution (UKP) scheme for 
multiphase wireless sensor networks in mobile environment. Our scheme is based on 
using different and distinct key pools at each generation. In this way, we improve the 
resiliency against heavy node capture attacks as compared to RoK scheme [5], while 
still maintaining perfect local and global connectivity.  
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